Monday, October 21, 2013

The Bazaar Catallaxy as an Entanglement of Public and Private Enterprise

          The word bazaar is Persian for “place of prices” and historically described an enclosed and covered area housing numerous privately operated booths trafficking in commodity goods. These markets have existed in both western and eastern cultures for thousands of years. In the book, Bazaar and State in Iran, Arang Keshavarzian defines a bazaar as “a series of socially embedded networks within a bounded space that is the mechanism for the exchange of specific commodities.” (Keshavarzian 2007). These ancient marketplaces served as the central economic institution for trade and became the hub of not only market activity, but also political, religious, and social interchange. Many large shopping malls, international airports, and even state universities of today share much with the economic model of the bazaar.
          Foundationally, the bazaar catallaxy begins with the designation of a bounded space to be used for a single primary purpose. In the case of the ancient market bazaars, this purpose was trade. This same requirement for common purpose is at the center of modern examples—transportation for airports, shopping for malls, and education for universities—each requiring the allocation of a large bounded space. The first element of entanglement of polity and economy usually begins with the acquisition of these spaces, which is easily accomplished when wielding the coercive power of government eminent domain.
          One of the largest and most successful bazaars was the Nizhnii Novgorod Fair, founded in 1817 and situated on the Balakhonskaia Peninsula at the confluence of the Oka and Volga rivers (Fitpatrick 1990). Marshaling the skills of architects under government contract, the location and construction of the fair’s infrastructure arose in much the same way airports or malls emerge today (Coburn 2011). In the Nizhnii Novgorod Fair, the regional government provided the policing and sewage control as well. Patrons tend to think of the plurality of vendors in a bazaar catallaxy as a single entity—“Do you want to go shopping at the mall?” rather than to a specific store. This perception allows the creator/owner of a bazaar to provide services as a market maker.


Figure 1

          Structurally, the bazaar consists of a set of horizontally competitive enterprises residing within the bounds of the catallaxy as shown in Figure 1(H1, H2, H3, H4, …). The horizontal business units, while competitive with each other, form a critical mass that draws not only large numbers of customers, but also vertical or supporting services (V1, V2, V3, V4, V5, …) such as money changing, food courts, transportation, and possibly even housing. The bazaar entanglement of polity and economy increases further when the polity provides some of these ancillary services—most often policing and utilities, as represented by element V0 in Figure 1. The vertical services in a bazaar, when not provided by the polity, tend to consist of competitive offerings. For example, in an airport there will be multiple transportation services including private automobiles, taxicabs, metro lines, rental cars, and buses. Food and shopping services will be varied, as will on-property hotels if any.
          An important phenomenon of the bazaar is the partnerships that often form between competing horizontal firms. In Afghan bazaars, these loosely bound guilds are known as quams (Coburn 2011). In airports, the airlines organize into quams as a way of dealing with difficulties such as mechanical failures, bumped passengers, and as a way of extending their market reach. If American Airlines suffers from a mechanical failure, they have the ability to electronically transfer bumped passengers and luggage directly to a competitor’s flight. These quams also extend their membership to include vertical services such as hotels for weather-stranded passengers and meal coupons accepted by airport restaurants. The close proximity and shared infrastructure of the bazaar makes this kind of collaboration simple and worthwhile to implement.
          International airports present another set of administrative challenges, because their primary purpose is cross-border travel, which requires them to deal with such things as immigration rules, import and export duties, and potentially incompatible security standards. These regulatory aspects of travel present additional opportunities, and perhaps excuses, for the polity to further imbed itself into the catallaxy.
          Whatever the primary service offering of the bazaar, the homogeneity of the horizontal competition and the well-defined nature of the vertical and ancillary services make the bazaar catallaxy highly susceptible to active participation on the part of the polity. 

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Works Cited

Coburn, Noah. Bazaar Politics: Power and Pottery in an Afghan Market Town. Stanford, 
          CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.

Fitpatrick, Anne Lincoln. The Great Russian Fair: Nizhnii Novgorod, 1840-1890. New 
          York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

Keshavarzian, Arang. Bazaar and State in Iran. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
          2007.


Monday, October 7, 2013

The Political Business of addressing Information Asymmetries

          A political business model commonly financed by the parliament is a political firm, tasked with addressing supposed market information asymmetries. These agencies often serve as gatekeepers, suffering from distorted incentives that arise from inappropriate sources of funding. Competitive markets have faced information asymmetries since the dawn of human trade because it is inevitable that one of the parties to a transaction will have an information advantage over the other. Sometimes the problem is addressed through pricing mechanisms and perhaps more often with reliance on reputation effects. A seller on eBay, with no ratings history, will have to post a significantly lower price to overcome the risk a buyer sees in dealing with a first-time seller. In comparison, a long-time seller with hundreds of positive ratings can expect to receive a premium price. Market-based business models that successfully address the risk of information asymmetries include objective third-party ratings firms earning fees by providing buyers with independently generated ratings (i.e. Consumer Reports), and market makers that collect and present crowd-sourced ratings (i.e. eBay). In both of these cases, the information generated is objectively produced and helps to reduce transaction costs.
          If a market-based ratings firm chooses to generate revenue from producers instead of consumers, the information provided to the consumer becomes tainted, as shown by the once highly respected financial instrument ratings agencies. For many years, the earnings of these firms came from investors seeking to overcome the information asymmetries inherent in complex financial transactions. When new government ratings requirements were imposed for investments made by certain money market funds, pensions, and government agencies, the ratings firms made the tragic decision to move to the more lucrative model of charging the issuers and providing their services free to investors (McLean and Nocera 2010). This shift in the business model forced the issuers, desperate to satisfy the new rating requirements, to negotiate with the four government-anointed rating firms as “paying customers.” With revenue and profit on the line, investment ratings suffered severe inflation. The inflation began when the ratings agencies chose to generate revenues from the source of the information asymmetries.
          Political firms created to address information asymmetries receive funding from the parliament and often additionally from user fees paid by the producers being rated. For example, it is the mission of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), as an “objective” third party, to act as a gatekeeper and as the primary source of essential healthcare information for the public. While two-thirds of the funding for the FDA comes from Congress, the third part is collected from pharmaceutical and medical device companies in the form of user fees (Fontanarosa, Drummond and DeAngelis 2004). There is ongoing pressure from Congress to increase the revenues from these fees, thus reducing the dependency on taxpayer funding (Food and Drug Administration 2012). Since there are numerous FDA employees tasked with assessing new medical breakthroughs, it is likely that producers will expend significant resources to determine the smoothest path through the approval process. Mid-level bureaucrats are afraid of garnering negative attention from supervisors and are therefore motivated to be reasonable in their treatment of what are essentially “paying” customers. An obstructive bureaucrat, with a reputation for being heavy-handed, will be avoided or will receive numerous complaints.
          In opposition to the revenue incentive is the fear of making a rating error that results in deaths or other catastrophes and once again drawing unwanted negative attention. Since the primary funding source of most political firms is the parliament, the bureaucratic prime directive of self-preservation is the highest priority. This risk can be mitigated by creating a mountain of well-documented procedures that, if followed, protect the individual worker from the wrath of a supervisor and provide documentation if it becomes necessary to defend the actions of the agency. The "red tape" mechanism addresses the fear that failure will lead to inevitable funding and job cuts. In the case of the Food and Drug Administration, we see a political firm that responds to these incentives by making the navigation of the bureaucratic process very costly—smaller firms and orphan drugs need not apply—while providing an expensive but almost inevitable approval for the innovations of larger health-care providers.
          In conclusion, in a competitive market, without the entanglement of the polity, the asymmetric information problem is usually addressed with an objective business model, ensuring consumers receive the information required to reduce transaction costs. In contrast, the political firm operates on funds from the parliament and the producers to provide consumers with what is perceived as free information, but is in fact costly, incomplete, and suspect.


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Works Cited

Fontanarosa, Phil B, Rennie Drummond, and Catherine D DeAngelis. "Postmarketing  
          Surveillance—Lack of Vigilance, Lack of Trust." The Journal of the American Medical 
          Association 292, no. 21 (December 2004): 2647-2650.

Food and Drug Administration. "FY 2013 Budget Overview." www.fda.gov. May 21, 2012. 
          http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/
          BudgetReports/UCM301719.pdf (accessed October 5, 2013).

McLean, Bethany, and Joseph Nocera. All The Devils Are Here. New York, NY: 
          Penguin Books, 2010.